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1,. ITRODUCTORY NOTE
The following brief essay was written at the request of the
Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technolo
for the purpose of comparing Soviet techniques of political indotri.-
nation with those of Commnist China, specifically as applie towar
prisoners of war, Although many of the findings, outlined in the
following pages, will universally apply to all PWs that the USSR
has held during and after World War II, investigation has bei.en
concentrated primarily on the experiences of German PWe
The method used has been a combination of field interviews
and library researcho With regard to small elite groups, such at
the NKPD or the BDO the object was to obtain as large a sample as
possible to permit quasi-quantitative analyses, In the case of the
labor camps, the object was to obtain a representative random sample
A number of ex-prisoners, now residing in the German Federal Repuboli
had written autobiographical accounts which served aa a good
starting point, both for the location of subjects and for procur'.g
some background materiaL Interviews with those subjects served the
double purpose of filling in on info rmation not covered in their
written accounts and on comparing t he latter, usually written short
after their release from captivity, with their present recollections
In addition, most of these subjects proved useful in discussig and
locating other ex-fellow prisoners The German Red Cross and a ni4zcr
of West German federal agencies were helpful in providing other
contacts. The sample also includes a few ex -prisoners2 now in the
service of Communist East Germany,
Interviews would range from two to four hours, using the method
of free association0  The interviewing phase was begun only after
the writer had conducted the necessary library research on the
historical events surrounding the prisoner of war issue,-
Except for the few subjects serving with the East German
regime, the overwhelming majority of the sample is now gainful1y
employed in West Germany in business, industry, and the professions-
The few exceptions are retired professional soldiers (Gen, v0 Seydlit
successfully fought a court action for his pension in West Germany
following his return from the USSR), individuals with independent
means of income (Count Av Einsiedel is now married to a well-known
German actress), or an occasional free-lancer,
With the exception of crimes involving bodily harm to fellow
prisoners or causing war crimes sentences as a result of false
accusations, collaboration ger se has not been a punishable offence
in met Germany, Thus, returning collaborators faced no legal bars
in finding employment in commerce or private industry, or in
practicing a trade. Limited social discrimination would seem to have
occurred only in a few well-known cases, Former Nazi affiliations
were much more likely to be responsible for enforced changes in
occupation in some subjects,
,13
A large percentage of the sample had been too young fo.r any
occupational experience prior to captivity, except military serivice,
Of those who returned to their previous occupations, the percentage
of professional people was particularly high,
From the outset the reader should bear in mind certain funda-
mental differences between the situation of American PWs in Korea
and German PWs in the USSR:
l, The overwhelming majority of American PWs had no basic
quarrels with either their government or Anerican political and
social institutions. The few exceptions comprised some members of
racial minority groups, especially negroes, a few elements of low-
level income groups, and social misfits. In contrast, there were,
amongst German PWs, distinct groups opposed to their political regime
at home, or at least to certain aspects of that regime,,
2,. Both Germany and the USSR were engaged in a lif e-and-death
struggle, defeat, to whomever it came, being synonymous with the
collapse of the political regime at home, To the United States and
the Chinese Peoples Republic, the Korean War remained throughou t a
localized conflict that did not require total employmzent of all their
human and material resources (even though China had to accept certain
aid from the USSR)., Such major differences in the waging of war
obviously would, among other things, influence the treatment of PWs
and their utilization, It meant to the individual prisoner that, if
and when he would be repatriated, he would either return to a country
in which the political and social system had remained intact (as was
the case with American PWs returning to the United States, or Chinese
PWs returning to the Chinese People's Republic), or he would return
to a defeated country in which the political and social system had
collapsed. As the fortunes of war progressively turned against the
Axis powers in World War II, it was the German soldier whose ultimate
fate became increasingly uncertain and who was likely to return to
a very different Germany from the one he had left,
3, The American soldier who collaborated with the enerny had
to accept full responsibility for his actions after repatriation-
his only alternative was to remain in an alien environment: his
German counterpart would automatically be repatriated to Communist-
controlled East Germany, if he originated from that part of the
country, or could choose to be sent there, if his last domicile had
been in West Germanye The American, then, who collaborated with the
enemy and was unwilling to accept responsibility at home, had to
make a complete break with the past, whereas the German was not
necessarily faced with that predicament, something which in the early
years, however, he could not foresee, for as long as the USSR might
be defeated, his predicament would be worse then that of the GI, as he
would have no haven to go to.
4i The American PW, once repatriated, no longer found himself
in an environment that was manipulated, whereas the German PW who was
returned to East Germany continued to live in rigidly controlled
surroundings,
Finally, there were the differences resulting from the
different types of conflict fought, The Soviets held hundreds of
thousands of German prisoners during the war---a figure that went into
the millions after the total German collapse, It was clear that the
kind of intensive indoctrination carried out by the Chinese of
American soldiers in Korea, could not be introduced on the same scale
by the Soviets toward German PW in World War IL
II, SOVIET IDOCTRINAT ION OBJECTIVES
In its political indoctrination program directed at FWs, the
USSR pursued a number of objectives, some of them simultaneously,
L. Fulfillment of Ideological Lega
Soviet writers and theoreticians in the early years of the
regime had evolved basic tenets governing the treatment of PWsB
derived from Marxist-Leninist concepts of war 9 revolutionary war,,
and wars to which the Soviet peoples were a partye These concepts
are sufficiently well known not to need any elaboration here,, Froa
them it seemed to develop logically that in any war to which the
RSFSR or later USSR was a party (the latter by definition repre-
senting the interests of the working class) the bulk of the enlisted
men in the eneqr's arry ought to be considered brothers of the
Soviet people, since they too would have a working class background,
They only had to be liberated from the exploitation of their
capitalist bosses, who were represented in the army by the officer
class. Consequently, the Soviet authorities separated officers from
enlisted men in the PW camps which they took over from the authorities
of the provisional government 'in Wrld War I, placed only the
officers behind barbed wire and had them guarded by their own meno
This practice was continued with Polish PWs during the campaigns of
the twenties,
Consistent with these concepts, the Soviets advocated the
doctrine of voluntary repatriation of PWe in the area of international
law, an attitude from which they radically departed in later yearse
Yet,, there is sufficient evidence to suggest that certain routinized
behavior toward PWs, as learned during the early years of the
regime, continued to be practiced up to recent times, sometimes to
the detriment of other competing objectives
2. Prisonerse-of-War as Propaganda Instruments
The Seventh Division of the Red Army (Propaganda) utilized
individual FWs for the production and dissemination of propaganda
leaflets and radio broadcasts long before the formation of the NKBD,
and, indeed, continued these activities even after the establishment
of the latter, with little or no coordination except on the highest
policy-making level.
PWs might be persuaded to render such services almost immediately
after their capture and prior to their being sent to permanent camps.
or they would be graduates from an anti-Fascist school and assigned
to the Red Army for psychological warfare duties, The latter pro-
cedure was obviously the more desirable from the point of view of
the Soviet authorities but the exigencies of war made improvisation
a frequent and necessary evil,
Although the NKFD, set up in July 1943, served more than one
purpose in the Soviet scheme of things one purpose clearly was to
undermine the morale of the German fighting man, Its regullar broad-
casts over Radio Moscow, but under its own identity, its occasional
8loudspeaker propaganda at the front, and its production of leaflets
drooped over the German lines were designed to explode the Nazi vyth
that the Soviets made no prisoners, to reduce the fighting spirit
of the German soldier and, wherever possible, to induce him to
surrender to the Red Arny4
Similarly, NED broadcasts beamed to the German home front aimed
at dividing the German people and, thus, at breaking its will to
resist. As distinct from the direct use made of PWs by the Red
ArriW for psychological warfare purposes (which was confined to the
utilisation of the prisoneres linguistic skills and his cultural
background), the prisoner who spoke on behalf of the NKFD assund,
in addition, a symbolic significance, for the NKP!D ostensibly was,
not the mouthpiece of the eneiy, but professed to speak on behalf of
the German people,
3 Prisoners of War as Political Instruments
If the utilization of the NIMD for purposes of psychological
*
warfare had been one reason for its inceptiord, political considerations
were anothere In the sumer of 1943 despite the spectacular success
of the Red Aray at Stalingrad, Stalin did not yet feel certain of
This coincided with the realization on the part of the Soviet le ader,
ship that the pre-1933 Communist line adopted by German emigrees in
the USSR in their attempt to indoctrinate PWa had been totally in-
effective and thatf, hence, propaganda addressed to the German soldier
and civilian would be equally ineffective, unless a more patriotic
and less Comnunist line was taken,
9victory, especially as he continued to suspect the intentions of
the Western Allies,. The Allied landings in North Africa and the
planned and rumored invasions of Italy and the Balkans seemed to
him as much directed against Soviet influence in Eastern Europe as
against the Axis powers. The spectre of an understanding between
Nazi Germany and the Western allies was a constant nightmare. The
latter was all the more real to him, as he himself made overtures
in this direction, There is evidence that, beginning with the late
fall of 1942, he repeatedly established contact with Nazi Germany
in an effort to explore the possibilities of a separate peace
When these efforts remained unsuccessful, a new approach was
sought in which the NKFD was to play its part. Its establishment
was to serve two purposes, Firstly, it would create inside the USSR
a group of anti-Nazi Germans of diverse political beliefs and friendly
to the USSR, which could either be the nucleus of a future German
government, or through which the USSR could exert influence in the
event of a successful coup d'etat within Germany. Secondly, its
existence could be used as a means to blackmail the Western Allies
and to make them more amenable to Soviet wishes, Characteristically,
the NKFD ceased to serve the latter purpose after the Teheran Conference
in December 1943 which assured the Soviets of the Iloyalty" of the
Western Allies,, Consequently, all Soviet overtures toward Germany
ceased after that date,
*See Boris Meissner, Russland, Die Westraichte und Deutschland: Die
Sowjetische Deutschlandpolitik 1943-1953 (H.H. Nalke Verlag: Hamburg,
1954)s) p. 13-21,
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The NKFD as a means of exerting influence upon a new revolutionary
government in Germany lost its meaning with the failure of the
assassination attempt upon Hitler in June 1944, This would have left
the NKFD with only one of the original functions for which it was
created-to provide the leadership for a new post-war Germany, But
by now the tide of the war had turned so much in favor of the anti-
Axis camp that the Soviets no longer had need to engage in political
compromises- Subsequent agreements* with the Western Allies called
for separate occupation zones within a defeated Germany so that it
was no longer necessary to provide for the leadership of a pro-Soviet
"bourgeois" government in Germany, Henceforth the task was to train
the personnel for a Communist-dominated East Germany,
4,, The Training ofan Elite
Although contractual arrangements about the occupauan of Germany
among the Allies did not exist until September 1944, the principle
of occupation by zones, rather than joint occupation, had been
visualized for some timeo. Thus, there was good reason for the Soviets
to select from among the large numbers of PWs at their disposal men
who could be expected to play the Communist game in post-war Germany
and to train them for that purpose, However, even before the pattern
of post-war Germany began to emerge, the 3oviets were interested in
selecting potential opinion leaders who could be trained as propagandists
'The Protocol of September 12, 1944, signed at Lancaster House, London0
fand agitators,. Such men would be sent to anti-Fascist schools, where
they would be exposed to a program of rigid Communist indoctrination,
Following their graduation, they would be returned to PW-camps to
work as "activists", or they would be attached to Red Arr units
as propagandists, After the war they were mostly transferred to
East Germany to occupy key positions in the administration, the
party bureaucracy, and the different media of mass communications.
Some were sent to West Germany, either to work openly for the Conmunist
Party, as long as it w as permitted to operate in the German Federal
Republic, or to engage in sub rosa activities.
- - - .- - - - -- .-. , --.....p.....l. . , ... L 3.. -- - - -
0III SOVIET TREATMENT OF GERMAN FQ rA A Uh Y OF EV S
Timne~ location and circumitances mnder i 'h cpture took lace
played a significant part in determining the individual pisoiner
vulnerability to indoctrination attempts, The year of capture would
materially affect the prisoner's assessment of Germany's chance,
of vi tory, and orsequently his fighTing morale, as well as his
wllUngness to accept the risks of collaboration; the season and
climate of the region would have a direct influence upon hi chLe
to survive the physical hardships of captivity and his will to
resist the temptations of collaboration; his physical and mental con
dition would depend in large measure upon the action he had been
engaged in prior to his capture -whether he had belonged to a rested
well-supplied unit that was advancing, or whether capture had come
after weeks of hard defensive battles, or whether it coincided itb
the collapse of Germany and the end of the war, as was the case with
the largest contingents of prisonere.
Variations of the above situations existed throughout the Soviet
German campaign; however, for the purposes of this investigation the
period will be broken down into four major phases
1 1941-1942, the pre-talingrad Period
It is estimated that the USSR captured between 80,000 and 100 000
German PWs 'up to the battle of Stalingrad, In the beining, thIs
ricluded men who had been cut off from thei units in the course of
0rapid advances, surviving crews of aircraft ani tanka put out of
action behind the Russian lines, woiunded who had remained on the
battlefield when their units were fored to withdraw, paratroopers
who had been unable to maintain their positions until the ground
forces had made contact with them, deserters, and, beginning with the
winter -of 1941-4 2, increasing numbers of soldiers whose positions
had been overrun in the first major counter-offensives of the Red
"rmy. In view of the precarious situation in which the USSR found
itself during that phase of the war, physical conditions were parti-
cularly severe and not more than 8 to 10 per cent of the prisoners
are believed to have survived captivity.
The first twenty-four hours in a prisoner's life were mentally
the most taxing,, The prisoner had been led to believe by persistent
Nazi propaganda that the Soviets would not make prisoners and,
therefore, expected execution upon or immediately after capture-
Hitler's own notorious "Commissar-decree" which called for the execution
of all captured Soviet commissars lent but added credibility to these
fears, But even the realization that captivity did not inevitably
mean death made the first twenty-four hours the most traumatic single
experience. The sudden and complete separation from one's next of
kin, the breaking up of all formal group ties, the uncertainty of the
future, and the prospect of slave labor in Siberia or the Urals called
for an unparalleled adjustment,
Detailed and frequent interrogations by Red Army officers were
standard procedure, Before being taken to collection centers, PWs might
be employed as labor gangs with Red Army units (e~go fortransporting
ammunition, road and bridge building, or as truck drivers)
An especially critical phase in the prisoner' a capacity to
survive came during the marches to collecting centers or transit
campso Similarly, the mortality rate of PWs on rail transports from
the collecting centers to permanent camps was always high (in November
19&1, 1,500 PWs out of a total of 3,500 died on a transport from
Jawas to Karaganda*) Frequent epidemics, in addition to malnutrition,
etc.., caused the death of many others, both in transit and in
permanent camps,, Of a total of 700 PW in Jawas, 400 perished from
December 1941 to June 1942, whereas out of 3,,000 PWs in a camp in
the Urals, 2,500 died from typhus between May 1942 and Fall 1943,1
The majority of the permanent camps during this early period
were located in Southern Siberia and the Urals, On the one hand
this was done to discourage the escape of PWs, on the other, to ease
the Red Arrq s supply problems, Officers mere usually separated from
the men and sent to Krasnogorsk, Gorki=Oranki, and Jelabuga (these
remained the principal officers' camps throughout the war and after)
It is interesting to note how much the Soviet attitude toward
officers had changed since the early days of the Revolution., Consistent
with the radical changes that had been introduced within the Red Army
and with the elevated positions that Red Army officers had assumed
captured enenq officers were not compelled to work outside their
camps but merely responsible for the upkeep of their camps (in con-
formity with the Geneva Convention), and received better food rations,
Deutsches Rotes Kreuz, Zur Geschichte der Kriegsgefa n im Osten




Because officers had the necessary letstre, and were, moreover, past
and potential future opinion leaders, they beameI primary targets
for indoctrination attempts,
Political instructors soon descended upon the camps,, They came
from the ranks of German .emigiees who had been one-time members of
the German Communist Party in the days of the Weimar Republic,
Most of them had by now become Soviet citizens,, Their formal lectures
and informal discussions were exact replicas of the type of dogmatic
Communist propaganda that had characterized party rallies in the
twenties or early thirties, They had been in exile for ten years,
had only very vague ideas of life within Nazi Germany, and no longer
spoke the language of the German laborer. Slogans, such as "German
workman., you dommit murder against your own brother by fighting
against members of your own class" no longer were the cues for learned
responses, but caused either amusement or irritation among PWs,-
This direct and' crude attack upon their belief system largely failed,,
for the German soldiers had seen enough of life in the Soviet Union
to appreciate the gulf between prophecy and reality Moreover,, whether
or not they saw eye to eye with their regime at home, the majority of
German PWs still believed in a German victory at that stage of the
war, and hence the consequences that might result from collaboration
acted as a powerful deterrent.
But dogma is not easily changed and although the emigree group
realized that different tactics were needed (they seemed nevertheless
less flexible than the Russians in inat respect), only a policy
decision on the highest level could brn aout u a change n
the meantime the inadequate old methoas co-ntinued to dominate th
approach., Communist cadres were formed among the smnall number of
col1aborators-few enlisted men, and even fewer officerso
The first anti-Fascist school was established in Zone 3 of the
officers' camp at Krasnogorsk, Living conditions for stuierts were
better than in the other zones of the camp, but they were not wed
to become tab markedly different at that time, The number of
participants during this early phase was relatively snall, not ex
ceeding two hundred for the German nationality division. Upon
graduation the following oath had to be takent
I, a son of the Germian people, hereby swear in undying
love to my people, ray country and my family, to fight on
until Fascisn and Militarism have been uprooted and
destroyed, until the shame of Ritlerite barbarism has been
wiped out and my people are thereby made free and happy
again,
I swear to fight unconditionally for this aim., to devote
all my energies to it and to sacrifice if necessary even nqy
life itself, to remain loyal to the cause of freedom and of
the people to the last breath in my boy, and to work tire
lessly to fit myself to fight this struggle successfullye.
This oath binds me fraternally to all other anti-Fascista
in fighting loyally for the final and complete victor; y of
our holy cause,
I swear to proceed ruthlessly against anyone who may break
this oath,
Should I break this oath and become a traitorc te ry people
#Wy country and ay family, may the just anger of the peple
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fall on me, May my comrades in the struggle judge me and
condemn me as a traitor and an enemy of the people, an enemy
of progress and an enemy of peace,*
Graduates would then be attached to Red Army units at the front for
psychological warfare duties, or they would be distributed among
PW camps, where they became factivists"o
At the time of the encirclement of the German armies at
Stalingrad, some of the most promising graduates of the school, among
them an ex-captain and an ex-lieutenant of the Wehrmacht, were
selected by Manuilski, one-time chairman of the Comintern and then
Head of the Political Administration of the Red Army (to be
succeeded by General Shcherbakov) and proceeded with some of the
prominent emigre leaders to the pocket, where they addressed via
loudspeakers the encircled German forces, When they utterly failed
in their mission under circumstances which scarcely could have
been more favorable, it revised Soviet thinking, and henceforth a
new approach was adopted Communism and Internationalism was to
be de-emphasized, and instead, German nationalism was to be given
ful range.
2, 1943-1945 from Stalingrad to Capitulation
When the Red Army completed the encirclement of Axis troops of
some 22 divisions in the Stalingrad area on November 9, 1942, there
were an estimated 223,000 men inside the pocketo The last resistance
* ritz Lwenthal, News from Soviet Germany Londont Victor Gollanca,
1950), p. 37,
of the defenders eased on February 1931 AIbout 30,000 wounTded
had been evacuated by air, ot 10l X0 died in atleV and
approximately 93,000 w4ere taken pisone'r he tempe ra ture in the
3talingrad region at the time was s- r and th majority of the
troops suffered from exposure and ;enl-ietarvation prior to capture
As a result,, the mortality rate during marches to collection ;enter
was particularly high, Marg man died from exposure, others brke
doun on the roadside and were shot by Soviet guarda-
The Russians were totally unprepared for such large numbers
of PWs so that food, sanitary conditions, and even the most primitive
type of shelter were lacking in collection centers" Epidemics which
had already begun inside the pocket quickly spread and also took
a heavy toll in lives,
Approximately 40% of surviving PWs were sent to permanent
camps in the European portion of the Sovie t Union; 60% to its
Asiatic portion, Losses in lives during these transports amounted to
354%, A mere 18,0O reached their destination, ie, 54.5% of all
thiose who were placed on transports, Of the survivors 12,000 subse-
quently perished, so that only 6,000 PWs of the 93,000 taken at
Stalingrad survived captivity and were returned to Germany after the
Apart from the 93,O00 men captured at Stalingrad an additional
400,000 to 50,000 fell into Soviet handa by the end of 1944 These
comprise:
K(a) approximately 90,00 - 100,00 prilsoners takm between
the winter of 19L2-43 and spring of 1944 (outside
Stalingrad), mostly in defensive batte s on the northern
front and on the Grimea, as well as at the Cherkassy-Korsum
pocket, Between 40% and 50% of these ?We survived captivityl
(b) some 30,000 PWs taken in the so-called Brody pocket in
June=July of 1944 of whom approximately 80% survived ti-
vity;
(c) 150,000 man captured at the time of the collapse of the
central front also in June-July of 1944, who suffered
20-25% losses during marches and in oollection centers
prior to reaching permanent camps; and
(d) approximately 200,000 PWs taken in the Roumanian theater
of war of whom about 60% reached camps within the USSR
alive,
Despite the heavy losses suffered by any one of these groups, it is
obvious that none paralleled the statistics of the Stalingrad PWsi
The above figures describe better than anything else the fate
of the average Stalingrad prisoner and his exceedingly small chances
of survival, But this group also included a group of general and
staff officers, for whom the Soviets had special plans and who,
therefore, led a very different life, In th4e latter weeks of the
Stalingrad drama there occurred scenes unprecedented in the history
*Deutsches Rotes Kreuz, Zur Geschichte der Kriegsgefangenen im Osten
Part I (1954), througho-ut. n
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of the German army, When the defenders of the pocket realized that
they were being sacrificed by a ruthless and megalomanic leadership,
many openly condemned Hitler, Some of his most ardent followers
committed suicide, others became his bitter enemies,, The Soviets
were quick to exploit this situation, sent a special train with
sleepers, diners and friendly nurses to the s cene, and transported
in comfort and relative elegance 22 generals and a large number of
staff officers to Camp 27 at Krasnogorske. Having been feted on
caviar and vodka, they made a majestic entry into Zone 1 to the
disbelieving eyes of their fellow-prisoners The privileged treat-
ment, however, did not turn these officers into collaborators by
any means, Known anti-Fascists were ostracized by them and even
those officers who severely criticized Hitler never considered the
possibility of turning against him at that time. The crude approach
of some of the anti-Fascists merely reinforced this attitude, An
obvious lack of management was evident if it was possible for the
students of the A-school in Zone 3 (who were allowed to enter Zone 1
once a week to take showers) to march past the generals singing the
*The German public was given vivid descriptions of how the generals,
shoulder to shoulder with their men, had fought to the last. When
in spring 1943 the first bags of mail from Stalingrad PWs had reached
Germany via Turkey, Maj 0 -4Gene v. Weichs, visiting Hitler at his head-
quarters, expressed the hope that this mail would be delivered to
relatives without delay, Hitler put down his knife and fork, looked
around the group until everybody was silent, then he declaredo "The
men of Stalingrad have got to be dead." (See Heinrich Gerlach, Die
Verratene Armee (Munich: Nymphenburger Verlags-Handlung, 1957), 'p~ 560)
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including 3 staff officers. The P-group included several graduatea
from the A-school, some so-calleed delegates from the soldiers'
camps who, in view of the catastrophic conditions there had been
willing to sign or do almost anythirng that woild get them out of
the epidemic-ridden camps (many of these were leaders of labor
battalions), and several majors and captains from the officers
camrps, (2,500 officers of the Stalingrad army had been sent to qlranky
and Yelaouga where typhus had raged for months and reduced the number
of inmates by 50%, despite the better 'rations and general living
conditions in these camps) 6
At Oranky feeling against the anti-fascist movement ran high
because of the corruption and terrorism of the local polit-instructo r,
In Camp 97 at Yelabuga only a few dozen out of approximately 800
officers joined the local anti-Fascist group, In Susdal, where the
generals had been sent', wild arguments were fought between pro- and
anti-Hitler groups; but all turned a cold shouder toward the NKFD,
The choice of the imperial German colors as a symbol, rather than
those of the Weimar Republic', could delude nobody that, so far, the
complexion of the NK)D strongly favored the Communists, with Center
and Right being scarcely represented, The few officers, being unknown
to the German .soldier and public, were hardly in a position to act as
focal points around which anti.-Hitler forces would rally, and the only
name that lent itself for some propaganda was that of Count Heinrich
von Einsiedel, a 22-year old fighter pilot , shot down over Stalingrad,
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who was the great grandson of Bismarck and had been induced almost
immediately after capture to wite a.anti-Hitler leaflet as a means
of letting his family know th at he was alive, Einaiedel came from
a Junker family which had cons idered the Nazi movement as one that
had risen from the gutter, and thus tie break with Hitler was not
too difficult. As a young, successful fighter ace, he had given
little thought to the war and experienced few hardships Captivity
abruptly ended a rather pleasant and carefree, i dangerous existencer
He was mntally alert. Having grave doubts about a Gennan victory,
he eagerly studied Marxist4-Leninist literature when it was placed
at his disposal, Soon afterwards he declared himself an anti-Fascist,
He suffered mentally when he was ostracized by the Stalingrad
gene rals, but his ego was flattered by the many friendly interviLews
that high-ranking Russian Polit-officers conducted with him, and
while he had immediately clashed with the notorious polit-instructor
at Oranky (Wagner), he had be un influenced by Captain Hadermann a
very different type of anti-Fascist leader at Krasxnogorsk and an officer
and PW like himself, When he was offered the chance to serve on the
executive of the new Committee, he could not resist the temptation,
Aware of the lack of attraction that the NiD would have to the
German soldier and the generalty, the Soviets now began a drive to
make it more representative. A delegation from the ND, including
Einsiedel, visited the officerai camp at Yelabuge, where they wisely
asked the Russians to make attendance of the meeting to be called
compulsory, as they knew that a ttendance alone would be interpreted
as collaboration by the resister group. Jome 50 officers, out of a
group of approximately 800, were ready to join after the meeting was
over, but by the next day they had changed their minds under the
pressure and arguments of the resisters
The carrot that was offered next to the officers to make
collaboration more palatable was an officersO league, separate from
the NKED, This coincided with a move among some officers to band
together in some form of organization that would be recognized by
the. Russians
The active group of the NKFD had meanwhile moved to a former
rest home at Lunovo, outside Moscow,, Early in September up to 100
officers arrived from various PW camps, willing to join in an officers
league Another group, composed of six generals, led by Walter von
Seydlitz, CO of the 51st army corps, also arrived, They had been
selected from among the other generals and brought to Lunovo by the
Russians at the advice of officers who knew them personally on the
assmption that they might be won over in time, As they entered the
house, they refused to return any of the greetings, except those from
the officers they knew, But by September 7, this group too gave in
and declared its willingness to participate in the formation of the
projected officersu league, The rationalization behind their decision
was largely that the NKFD was a fait acc2omli anyway, and the only
way to prevent the comnittee from having all the say was by creating a
balancing force on the Right, The executive of the "Bund Deutscher
Offiziere" (E)O), set up on September 12, numbered about 30, with
Gene v, Seydlits as chairman, The BDO acceded to the principles of
the NKFD manifesto of July, and several officers, including Seydlitz,
ended up joining the NKFD (largely involuntarily and against their
better judgment), by some ingenious trick which amalgamated the two
organisations in a loose fashion and automatically appointed some
officers of the executive of the EO to that of the NKT), Thus the
latter at last assumed the representation that the Soviets had desired,
For the characterisation of Seydlitz, it should be added that
he was a man who had been opposed to t he Nazi regime long before his
captivity, At Stalingrad he had demanded in writing a breakthrough
of the enclosed forces "if necessary against the will of the Ffihrer
and only responsible to the German people," At Lunovo, prior to
joining the NXFD he had indignantly refused to sit down at one table
with deserters like the two old-time Communists Zippel and Gold
As for the other generals who participated in the E)O, Major-Gen,
Martin Lattmann, CO of the l4th Panzer Division, was a confirmed Nazi
who in earlier days at the artillery school at Juterbog had been known
to rebuke officers in his classes for not having read Hitler~s Mein
Kapf , At Camp Susdal, he had been one of the most vociferous men in
opposition to any collaboration with the Russians, LtGen,, Edler v,
Daniels,, CO of the 376th Infantry Division, was a controversial figure.
known for his addiction to alcohol and sex. In addition to participating
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in the EDO, he became a Vice-President oft the NKD, who later was
said to have signed anything unseen,, Dr. Otto Korfes, Maj--Gen, and
CO of the 295th Infantry Division, had been a one-time member of
the right-wing veterans organization "Stahlhelm"r He had been
critical of Hitler's policies at Stalingrad. Lt.1-en., Schlrmer,
GO of the 53rd Army Corps, had been a respected and popular man uho
*
only participated in the BDO,
Shortly after the establishment of the BDO, a delegation, headed
by Seydlitz, left for the generals' camp No, 48, There were
tumultuous scenes with cat-calls and hissing, as Seydlitz and his
companions spoke, and their recruiting drive ended in total failure.
Lumovo became the permanent seat for the executive committees of
the NKFD and the EDO, as well as for a number of experts in economic,
cultural and church affairs, numbering altogether approximately 50,
It housed the editorial offices of what became known as the sender
"Freies Deutschland" (broadcasting over Radio Moscow), and the news-
paper Freies Deutschland which became the successor to Das Freie Wort
and constituted the only link between LnAovo and the other camps,
In the latter it became the task of the "activists" to recruit
new members for the NKFD , Recruitment simply took the form of getting
a man to sign his name on the appropriate lists Independent selection
*Among the 11 members of the EDO who had joined the NKFD were also two
arng chaplains, one Protestant, one Catholic, In June 1944, the
Soviets organized a meeting of 30 army chaplains near Moscow at which
only two refused to sign a memorandum prepared by the two NKFD chaplainse
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of suitable students for the A-schools continued, as it had prior
to the establishment of the NKFD, Thus, the NKFD in the average
camp had no particular functions, except for the signing of occasional
resolutions, and to satisfy the "norm-filling" mania of the Soviet
system-it was important for the polit-instructor to be able to report
that a high percentage of camp inmates had become members of the
NKFD and thereby anti-Fascists ,
14.aison between Lunovo and tre Soviet authorities was provided
by the emigres, who had established themselves in a villa in Moscow
which to all intents and purposes was the true headquarters of the
organization, There were parallel offices for the sender "Freies
Deutschland" and the newspaper, and it was here that the real editing
was done. Even then, final censorship was exercised by an outside
agency.
The so-oalled "front-representatives" of the NKFD were graduates
from A-schools who thus merely continued, using the symbols of the
NKFD, the activities of those earlier graduates who had been attached
to Red ?rnv units as propagandists,
It lies outside the scope of this report to examine in detail
the aims and ac tivities of the NKFD Therefore, it will be discussed
only to the extent needed for an understanding of the attitudes of
supporters and opponents, At the time of its establishment and during
the early period of its existence the NKID called for the removal of
Hitler and the Nazi leadership and for the substitution of a democratic
government, and directly appealed to army commanders in the field to
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lead their forces back to Germany a pre-war frontiers,, Unlike Red
Army psychological warfare, it did not call for the surrender of
German troops, in view of the obje ctions of the generals and higher
officers who were unwilling to lend their support to "disruptive"
propaganda techniqueso It was to be foreseen that this approach,
while soothing the sensibilities of the higher-ranking officers, would
serve no practical purpose, for to the German soldier on the other
side, it was an impossible task to differentiate between the "noble"
and "honorable" objectives of the NKFD and the conventional propaganda
of the Red Army. Thus the latter merely helped to discredit the
Committee<
The Russians were, of course, not willing to put up indefinitely
with such an ineffective operation. As long as the NKFD served a
political purpose, they had been ready to go a long way toward meeting
the demands of the right wing for the sake of winning over as many
prominent names as possible; but once this purpose had largely been
fulfilled (at the time of the Teheran Conference), the Committee s
remaining usefulness lay nly in the area of front propaganda
*In a statement made to Dr, Benes in December 1943, Molotov declared:
"Germany must be carved up; but at the present time we must not disclose
our intentions, as otherwise we would only aid Hitler's cause, We must
do everything in our power in order to relieve the pressure upon the
Soviet armies. Seydlitz makes excellent propaganda, We shall employ the
German Communists for the same purpose: to split the Germans and thereby
facilitate the tasks of the Soviet army," Conveyed by Iduard Taborsky,
Benes' secretary, to the Manchester Guardian, as reprinted by Ost-Problede
Nr, 38, September 23, 1959 p1,5
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Here then was an impressive example demonstrating the futility
of "limited collaboration", Even without Soviet prodding, it soon
became clear to members of the NKFD that the lofty appeals to the
commanding generals to lead their armies back to Germany s pre-war
frontiers did not meet the needs of the frontline soldier who found
himself encircled by Russian forces, The only effective appeal that
could be made to him was to surrender, The generals were first
horrified when the suggestion was made to use disruptive propaganda;
but by now they were split within their own ranks and eventually had to
agree to the new course, Thus, a delegation, headed by Seydlits and
Dr. Korfes, went in February 1944 to the front at Cherkassy, where
several German divisions had been encircled, Direct appeals by letter
and loudspeaker were sent to two commanding German generals inside
the pocket, but remained unanswered, although their receipt had been
confirmed, Part of the encircled forces managed to break out,, and the
others were taken PWs after suffering heavy losses, The first attempt
of the NKFD had proved a dismal failure, Similar efforts were con-
tinued by prominent officers of the fiKFD until the end of the war with
no better results, It was clear that the NKD operations were
successful only among PWs; ise, in order to make any inroads, it
required the changed environment of captivity,
Meanwhile, the Nazi authorities had been forced to change their
policy toward the NKFD which, in the beginning, they had simply ignored,
partly because it was largely composed of Stalingrad fighters who
*allegedly were all dead Seydlitz was sentenced to death in absentia
by a military tribunal; the same fate befell all other members of
the NKD who had belonged to the German armed forces, These develop-
ments, in turn, could not fail to reinforce identification with the
Soviets on the part of those concerned,
The unsuccessful attempt on Hitler's life on July 209 1944 had
two direct consequences for the NKFD The fact that there had been
an actual German resistance group to which a number of prominent
military and civilian leaders belonged seemed to make opposition
to the Nazi regime less treasonable, and hence more acceptable to many
FWs* (to those who had already become collaborators the event was
welcome as a rationalization that they had done the right thing),
The brutal measures with which the Nazi regime suppressed the revolt
and especially the fact that they seized the opportunity to blackan
the record of the entire officers' corps and the nobility, induced
30 out of 70 captured German generals to join the MDO, By mid-August
even Field-Marshall v. Paulus, the German Supreme Commander of the
Stalingrad Army, whom the Soviets had hoped to win over from the day
of his capture, declared his entry into that organisation.
Twenty German generals captured at the time of the collapse of the
central front and without prior communication with the NIUD addressed
a joint appeal to the Wehrmacht to end the war through the removal of
Hitler's dictatorship.
**v, Paulus subsequently. appeared as a Soviet witness at the Nuremberg
War Crimes Trial.
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The climax was reached in a proclamation signed on December 8.
1944 by 50 generals in which, evoking the image of Hindenburg and
Ludendorff who demanded a cease-fire in 1918 from the Imperial
German Government (when further fighting seemed senseless), they
called for an immediate armistice and the removal of Hitler, Himmler,
and their system0
Ironically, whereas the assassination attempt had increased the
number of followers of the KFD and BDO respectively, it decreased
the s ignificance of the movement, For the failure of the revolt
inside Germany eliminated one of the purposes for which the NKFD was
created-to provide a link through which the Soviets could have
exerted influence upon the leaders of a successful military coup dgetate
The Soviets lost no time in adjusting to the new situationo The
unsuccessful plotters were quickly branded as "reactionaries" and
shortly afterwards certain elements at Lunovo, known within the NKFD
as a right wing who had resisted the influence of the emigres and left-
wing PWas, were, at the behest of Ulbricht, removed from Lunovo and trans.
ferred to other camps, where they were first to show that they were
That. Soviet calculations were not unjustified may be seen by the influence
that the NKFD exerted upon certain groups among the German resistance
movement, Sees Bernd Gisevius, Bis sm bitteren Ende, There were other
members of the resistance movement, however, who apparently considered
the activities of the NKFD treasonable, Thus, Ulrich v, Hassel wrote in
his diary on February 6, 1944: "The mental confusion and moral decline
produced by Hitler has been illuminated by two Things in recent timest
Seydlitz, Daniels, Czimatis, whom I know from the OKW (he made an excellen';
impression) have madeiatmpting appeal to the encircled forces at
Cherkassy to surrender via the Russian radio,"
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were true anti-Fascists, The group at Lunovo was simply told that
those transferred had left for o ther camps on a recruiting drive for
the organization,* They were gradually replaced by graduates from
the A-schools-
This was not the only blow which the right wing, mostly grouped
around Seydlits and the BDO members, suffered, Among the officers at
Yelabuga who, beginning with the first Communist propaganda drive,
had maintained close contacts with the polit-instructor, was a
Lieutenant Huber, an SS officer and section leader in the German
Ministry for Education, He subsequently joined the group at Lunovo,
where, one day, he was arrested by the NKVD when it leaked out that
he was working for the Gestapo and had specifically joined the NK[D
to work against it from within. He had succeeded in driving a wedge
between left and right wings and in discrediting the latter in the
eyes of the Soviets,
Scarcely less perturbing was a special request submitted to the
Soviets by Generals Arno vc Lensky and Vincent Muller, who had joined
the Lunovo group soms time after its inception, to attend the A-school,,
After some hesitation, the Soviets agreed. When the two graduated,
they had become convim ed Communists,.
The fact that the movement had outlived its political usefulness
was also symbolized by the fewer visits that high-ranking Soviet officers
would pay to Seydlitz and the generals on the NKFD,,
The group was led by a certain Dr, Wieder.
The new line was formalized in an article that Erich Weinert,9
the poet--chairman of the NKFI), wrote in 3eptember 1944 on the new
tasks of the Committeeo These were (1) to prevent further bloodshed
(meaning surrender of German forces to the Soviets); (2) to assist
the Soviet authorities in the establishment of a new Germany (which
meant the training of anti-Fascists who would carry out Soviet orders
in postwar Germany),,
With the unconditional surrender of Germany in May 1945 the
question arose: what would become of the NKFD and its mebers?
Having failed in making any significant contribution to the defeat
of Nazi Germany,, it had, as an organization, forfeited its claims
for the management of affairs in postwar Germany. This was the
assessment of the more sober members of the NKFD, and that was
exactly the line taken by the Soviets to rid themselves conveniently
of an organization that no longer served their purposes, However,
this did not rule out the utilization of individual mambers of the
NKFD and the BDO in East GermanyO At the very least all were con=
vinced that after having collaborated thus far, they would belong to
the first to be repatriated to Germany after the war These hopes,
however, remained unfulfilled and nervousness soon began to settle upon
the group, The Soviets had no intention of prematurely releasing and
trying to use anybody of whom they felt uncertain as to whether he would
play their game in East Germany or not.. But as some of these doubtful
elements happened to be experts in certain areas, they might still be
put to good use within the framework of the NKFD, Thus, a number
of working teams were formed that devoted themselves to such matters
as school reform, history text books, or church affairs, The
finished reports were submitted to Ulbricht and have indeed formed
the basis for a number of institutions introduced in East Germany sincen
On November 2, 1945 the NKFD and the EDO were formally dissolved
in a plenary session presided over by Weinert and Seydlitzs Approxi
mately half the members of the group were repatriated within the next
few months, The others, mostly members of the BDO, but also others,
including graduates from the A-schools, had to leave Lunovo and were
distributed among the generals' camp No , 48 and Susdal monastery
A closer look at those repatriated showed that, with the exception of
the army chaplains, they comprised those considered by the Soviets to
be reliable Communists or fellow-travellers, The clergymen, although
some of them had collaborated extensi vely, had served a useful
propaganda purpose and by their repatriation might continne to serve
the same purpose within Germany,
Those who had to remain in Soviet camps were composed of the "right
wing", i,,e., most of the BDO members, but also such A school graduates
as Count v. Einsiedel or Capt, Fleischmann who, their collaboration
notwithstanding, had demonstrated time and again with their independent
action that they were unwilling to carry out Soviet orders without
raising questionsr The two generals, Mueller and Lens ky, likewise
graduates from the A-school, were not yet repatriated either, though
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for different reasons, With demilitarization being one of the
principles that the occupation powers carried into effect in post-
war Germany, the appearance of Lwo Communist generals seemed somewhat
premature-
In Camp 48, all members of the group were ostracized by the
generals who lived there, despite the fact that many of them had signed
the anti-Hitler proclamation of December 1944 and become members of
the DO, By now they had renounced all such activities and submitted
themselves to so-called "courts of honor t , fomed by those generals
who had not wavered, asking for forgiveness and reinstatement into
the "fraternity". This by no means, however, meant the end of all
collaboration. Inside the camp they would do everything to conform
to the expected group norms; but at interrogations outside the camp,
many of them would yield to Sov iet pressures and supply information
relevant to the preparation of the war crimes trials of members of their
fraternity, Some served as NKVD informants, The fate of NKFD members
in this camp, as well as at Susdal differed greatly., Some were
repatriated within a year, others spent several more years in labor
camps and returned to Germany only with some of the last returning PWs5
3o 19451949 From capitulation to the "war crimes trials"
During the last months of fighting and with the unconditional
surrender of Germany in May 1945, several million German soldiers fell
into Soviet hands. Only a very small percentage of these were released
shortly afterwards; the bulk was transported to the USSR for construction
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work, Once again it was in the early phase of captivity that the
mortality rate was particularly high, for the concentration of tens
of thousands of FWs at collection centers created baffling and in-
surmountable administrative difficulties Adequate food and shelter
simply did not exist and many perished within the first months of
their captivity,
The chief purpose of this large group of PWs, as it had been
throughout the war, was to perform manual labor, Officers continued
to receive better food rations and to be responsible only for
maintenance work within their camps, However, in some localities
so-called "voluntary anti-Fascist officers' labor brigades" were
formed under Soviet pressure, After April 2, 1946 labor became
compulsory for al officers up to and including the rank of captain.
Officers in labor camps lived in separate huts but were otherwise not
barred from contact with the enlisted men and NCOs, In the beginning9
officers were often in charge of labor brigades; later, brigade leaders
were largely N1Os, In the event of strikes the Soviets would round
up the ring leaders and transfer them to special disciplinary camps.
*Approximately 55-60% of the fatalities occurred within the first year,
30-35% in the second year and 5-15% later By comparison, of the 1944
PWa 60-65% died within the first year, 25v30% in the following year and
5-45% later, In contrast, the Stalingrad group oXf PWg suffered 90-95%
of its fatalities within the first year and approximately 5-10% in the
following year. Although the number of deaths among PWs in the year
1945-46 is higher than at any other time, the mortality rate of the
Stalingrad group was about three times as high, i.e, whereas out of
100 prisoners taken in 1945, 30 did not survive captivity, only 10
out of 100 of the Stalingrad PWs survived,
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The political work within the camps pursued two objectives:
(1) to aid the Soviets in their endeavor to get the most work out
of the PW; and (2) to select and train suitable personnel for a
political and later even military elite in Germany, It was the task
of the "activistes"* in camp to promote propagandistically the output
of work of the labor brigades, Thus, they constantly harped on the
theme that true anti-ascism could only be proven by a maximum of
reconstruction work ("Wiedergutmachung"), and genuine anti-Fascists
would be repatriated sooner., They also would keep an eye on likely
candidates for the A-schools among their fellow-prisoners, There
were the usual lectures and discussions, or "Marxist-circles", which
were on the whole voluntary, although PWs were frequently pressured
into attendance, Another task of the activist was to spot "war
criminals" among the PWs and to encourage the other prisoners to denounce
known war criminals, Failure to name any war criminal was often
interpreted as siding with them.
The number of activists per camp depended upon the number of ite
inmates and varied from 3 to 10, or more, They lived in a separate
hut and were freed from manual laboro Ostensibly they were responsible
for the cultural activities in camps and frequently received a salary
(in some camps 100 Rubles per month). Most of them were A-school
graduates, occasionally physically disabled men. Beginning with 1948
they were "elected" in certain camps. They were normally distinct from
the camp administration which was appointed by the Russianso
In some camps they were called "propagandists".
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In addition to these full-time activists, there were other
activists in each hut or dwelling who provided liaison with the
activists0 headquarters, but who were not freed from work, They
would occasionally contribute an article to the wall paper, or
engage in other types of collaboration. They also served as direct
channels of information,
The emphasis on work performance was such that frequently the
political work was considered nothing but a necessary routine,0 There
were none of the ideological battles that were still raging in the
officers' camps, or that had been so characteristic of Lunovo,
Collaboration in the average labor camp was mostly confined to signing
one's name to resolutions, thanking the Soviet people for their
hospitality, or brandishing Nazi war guilt, Being pressured into
"spying" was certainly something else, but a good worker could escape
many pressures, without serious consequences. It was different with
those who had been guilty of some war crime and over whom the Soviets
consequently had a constant hold. Among those who participated in
"Marxist-circles", etc,, there were those who were genuinely eager
to learn something about Marxist-Leninist theory, but there were many
more who, in view of the catastrophic conditions in these camps,
participated in the hope of thereby increasing their chances of survival
or repatriation'
The history of the A-schools began early in World War II, Prior
to Stalingrad and again after 1946, they were Communist cadre schools,
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both in terms of the selection of students and the study plan. In
the years between they might be termed training schools for Communists
and fellow-travellers, For during these years, which broadly coincide
with the life span of the NKFD and the stress on "nationalism", the
Soviets used for the admission of undergraduates the same "key" that
had determined the composition of the executive council of the NKFD
when it was amalgamated with the BDO, and which was also used for the
setting up of "Aktivs" in the camps, The "key" referred to the






30% Ranging as far to the right as the "German Nationals"
The "key" was altered with the introduction of the so-called
"bloc-policy" in East Germany and hereafter was composed of
60% Communists and Social Democrats
40% Catholics and Liberals
with no more right-wing elements The Catholics became increasingly
unacceptable following Mr., Churchill's speech at Fulton and Secretary
of State ByrnesQ speech at Stuttgart, but it resulted in no new altera-
tion of the "key" as yet. This came only at the end of 1947 with a
famed speech by Zhanov which conatituted a major turning point in Soviet
h0
policy. Henceforth only working-class elements were to be trained
at the A-schools, and favoritism was shown toward industrial workers
as distinct from small peasants or agricultural workers, and even more
so as compared to intellectuals,, This took the form of simplifying
and rigging the examinations of industrial workers.,
The two central schools were located at Krasnogorsk and at
ralizi, near Gorki. Up to 1946 Krasnogorsk had the more advanced
program and the most promising graduates from Talizi would continue
studies at Krasnogorske From 1946 on the two schools had the same
program and became training centers for Communist cadres, At the
same time preparatory schools were established in all capital cities
of the Soviet Republics, where students would attend 4-6 weeks
courses, Only the most successful graduates from these preparatory
schools would then be admitted to either Talizi or Krasnogorsk, The
latter school was subsequently dissolved and a substitute was set up
at Riesau,
The schools were organized according to nationality sectors-
German, Austrian, Italian, Hungarian and Rumanian, The directors of
the schools were Russians, the instructors until 1947 exclusively
emigres; after that date some PWs who had successfully worked as
tfassistants" also became instructors. All assistants were PWe, Subjects
taught included dialectical and historical materialismi, political
economy, philosophy, Russian history, German history, the history of the
labor movement, etc..
The length of terms at the two central schools was extended after Zhanovvt
speech from three to six months,
0There were not more than W00 studen ts, including 200 Germans at
Krasnogorsk in 1944c. Half of the German studente were officerso
Students were divided into groups of 30C. There were ten hours of
formal studies per day, including 4-6 hours of lectures and seminars;
the remainder was devoted to individual readings,
With the changes introduced in 1947, discipline became much
stricter and the many sessions of self-criticism, culminating in an
autobiographical report, became genuine traumatic experiences, The
number of students also increased to about 2000 per year: Approximately
a total of 7000 graduated from Talisi alone, For a relatively short
period in 197 a large number of West German Pe were trained, whereas
from 1948 on only PWe whose domiciles were located in East Germany
were admittedo
The A-schools were the centers for political 're-education" and
the training of an administrative and communications elite, But the
Soviets did not neglect to create the nucleus of a Communist-oriented
military elite as well, In 1948 specially selected Pe began training
for service in the planned para-military police force for Eastern
Germany, Following their training these PWs were transported to East
Germany, beginning with 1949, where they primarily assumed positions
in the lower and medium ranks of the new force, Of the latterga
1500 staff officers, 501 were former Pe in the USSR. The higher ranks
were filled from graduates of the war acaders at Privolsk, near Saratov,
and included several ex-members of the NKiD and its executive council,
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Most of the latter had been early repatristes nnd served in prominent
positions in the DDR prior to their attendance of these courseso
4, 1949-1956 From the "war crimes trials" to final repatriation
The Soviets began as early as November 1941, a few months after
the German invasion, to set up a "Commission for the Investigation of
Fascist Atrocities". P number of trials were already held in war
time, such as the one at Charkov in 19431 A whole serie of public
trials followed in the years 1945-1946, notably against German
generals ana their staffs, There were 18 generals among those
tried during this period,, In November 1946, the USSR abolished the
death penalty, and many of those who had received the death sentence
had these sentences commuted into 25 years of hard labor.
Two waves of trials on a'much larger scale occurred in 1949
Preparation for these trials had been going on for several years,
Thus, members of the NKFD and the BDO had been pressured into informer
services and helped to prepare lists of "war criminals". Some anti-
Fascists "distinguished" themselves through adding more and more acts
which,, under Soviet law, were criminal offences, but which included
magy normal wartime practices of any army and the legality of which
*is fullly recognized under international lawn
Whereas the first trial wave of 19119 still had a semblance of
legality, the second wave largely became a farce in which minor in-
g $) the quartering of German troops in Russian dwellings,) the
requisitioning of food, or the felling of trees.
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fractions led to the maximum penalty, The Soviets, furthermore,
introduced the principle of collective guilt Membership e r se of
some 120 German divisions and special units, such as the Division
"Brandenburg", the 13th Panzer Division, Division "Grosadeutschland" ,
Division "Feldherrnhalle", all the SS divisions, "Landschiitsen" units,
field police, etc,, was enough to be tried, regardless of whether the
accused had been with the particular unit when it was supposed to have
comitted certain war crimes, On the other handO the very principle
of collective guilt was violated by the fact by no means all members
of the black-listed units were ever tried,
In May 1949,9 MVD commissions, canposed of 20-40 interrogators,
made their appearance in all the camps. Often they were followed
almost immediately by a tribunal, To extract confessions, solitary
confinement, the withholding of food, and other devices were used0
As soon as a prisoner had signed a confession., he would be rewarded
with better food and better general living conditions,.
Proceedings before the MVD tribunals began about 3-14 days after
the prosecutionIs announcemen t, and in most cases were a mockery of
accepted legal practice
In retrospect, there can be little doubt that the unusually late
trial waves of 1949 served but one major purpose.-to justify the
retention of tens of thousands of PWs so many years after the end of
hostilities and after repeated representations of the Western powers,
They permitted TASS to announce on May 4, 1950 that the repatriation
hof German PWa had been completed and that only "war criminals"
remained in the USSR to serve their sentences A detailed discussion
as to how those remaining PW were used as a political weapon by
the Soviet authorities in their negotiations with the representatives
of the German Federal Republic cannot be attempted here,
With the trials of "war criminals" in 1949 practically al
political activity in the camps ceased,
5. Summar
Summarizing Soviet handling of German We during the 16-year
period from 1941-1956, the following facts ens rge., In terms of
sheer numbers, manual labor was the chief purpose for which We were
used-from 1941-1945 to bolster the Soviet war effort; from 1945-1956
to assist in the reconstruction of the USSR_ Political activities
in labor camps, centering around the "Aktiv", played a subordinate
role and were canalized (a) to promote maximum labor output; (b) to
select suitable personnel for more advanced political indoctrination,
Interrogations, autobiographies, informer services, and participation
in Soviet-sponsored political activities aided the latter process,
Maximum political indoctrination was reserved for the officers'
and recreation camps, as well as the A-schools, It served a host of
political and propaganda purposes, The NKFD and the BDO both were
short-term instruments of wartime propaganda and political expediency,
"Conversion" to Commmism of its members originally was not contemplated
as an end in itself, but occurred by a process of osmosis, In order
to win initial support for the two organizations., the Soviets
exploited anti-Nazi sentiment, utilized the symbol of German
nationalism, de-emphasized Communism and permitted a maximum of
free expression>
As the short-term goals of the NKFD and the B)O either were
attained or became obsolete, both organizations became ideal breeding
grounds and screens for further political indoctrination. Many of
its members subsequently attended A-schools, The height of activities
of the NKFD/EDO occurred in the years 1943-1944. Both organizations
were officially dissolved in 1945,
The A-schools served the purpose of training a Communist elite.
Their students were selected from among promising collaborators in
all PW-campse. Advanced lectures in Marxist-Leninist doctrine, group
discussions, self-criticism, autobiographical critiques and a rigid
discipline were the techniques employed Graduates would return to
PW-camps as "activists", or be attached to Red Army units as
"propagandists" in war-time and placed into key positions in East
Germany after the war 0
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IV. SOVIET INDOCTRINATION TECHNIQUES-AN ANALYTICAL SUMMARY
L0 Basis for Recruitment
The selection of suitable subjects from among PWs for indoctrina-
tion purposes ideally depended upon the future role to be assigned to
each subject, It is, of course, not suggested here that the Soviets
approached each subject with a detailed and ambitious plan, although
there are a number of prominent prisoners where this was the case
It does, however, suggest, that selection proceeded according to
major purpose groups, Three such groups can be distinguished:
(1) For the purposes of training a political elite (responsi-
bility of the A-schools) dependability, unquestioned allegiance to
the Communist cause, a scund knowledge of Marxist-Leninist doctrine.
and preferably a working-class or intelligentsia background were the
required characteristics of each subject-
(2) For the purpose of training a military elite, it was expert
knowledge in military affairs, linked with a minimum of dependability
that was sought in potential subjects;
(3) For the purpose of utilizing PWe as instruments of propaganda
and international politics (primarily the responsibility of the NKFD
and the 20), it was desirable to secure the collaboration of a broad
and representative sample that contained as many prominent names as
possible,. "Conversion" to Marxism of some of these subjects* was never
visualized, although indoctrination in general remained a desirable
*E g ,, the clergymen,
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goalo The latter was all the more true since "membership" in any
of the three purpose groups was not exclusive and a certain amount
of mobility from group to group could be anticipated,
These were the desired groups of subjects in theory, The next
step was to establish criteria that could be used for locating
potential collaborators in the above categories, The first of these
consisted in the location and determination of "areas of discontent"
that the subject harbored toward the Nazi regime; the second consisted
in the ruthless exploitation of weak characters and such subjects over
whom the Soviets had a particular hold, To the latter group belonged
deserters, "war criminals", members of the SS and certain other
organizations, infoners, etc,
In their systematic and frequent interrogations of PWs, often
aided by the writing or reciting of autobiographies, the Soviets at
all stages of the war were anxious (apart from obtaining intelligence
on military affairs and condit ions ins ide Germany) to obtain a mental
picture of the subject's background and personality and to probe into
the possible areas of discontent with the existing regime in Germany,
Being prisoners of their own ideology, they, and especially their agents,
the German emigres, first and foremost suspected that they would find
such discontent among the German workers. They were greatly disappointed
when with the exception of a fei old-time Communists who, because of
their known affiliation had suffered under the Nazi regime, there was
little or no response in the beginning, largely because the German
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worker had been relatively well off, frequently had become a petty-
bourgeois who lacked all "class-consciousness"., This realization
however, did not prevent the Soviets from spending much time and
effort on that group, Their later temporary preoccupation with the
generals and prominent "bourgeois" elements, mostly for propaganda
purposes, should not becloud the fact that for the selection of
students for the A-schools the worker group consistently provided -a
major pool--from late 1947 on the almost exclusive pool--from which
the Soviets drew their personnel,
In their initial attempts to locate areas of discontent, the
Soviets were more successful as they examined the intellectual and
the clergyman, for many of both these groups would voice the dis-
satisfaction that results from the restrictions that any totalitarian
regime imposes upon their activities, Evidence of success was the
participation of several arry chaplains in the propaganda work of
the NKFD, culminating in the meeting of thirty army chaplains at
Lunovo in 1944,,
The intellectual's professional curiosity made him another
promising targeto He would be the most diligent reader of the classics
of Communism, whenever the opportunity was offered to him (especially
as it had been denied to him in his former environment). Somewhat
naively he thought he could accept or reject Marxism as he saw fit,
often to find out when it was too late that by this act alone, he had
initiated a chain of behavioral changes vis-a-vis his environment that
had nothing to do with the merits of Marx or Lenino High school
teachers, journalists and doctors were among the collaborators as
early as 1941. The intellectual had the added advantage that he was
a natural opinion leader; nevertheless, he began to be discriminated
against after the introduction of the new policy in late 1947o
Interrogations of the Stalingrad PWs revealed other areaa of
discontent that could be exploitedo There were those Junkers who,
despite the fact that they owed their careers to the Nazi policy of
rearmament and war, had, for reasons of caste snobbism and because of
the subscription to a different code of ethics, never been able to
stomach the Nazi movement and its leaders. When Hitler sacrificed
them at Stalingrad, their latent hostility came into the open and made
some of them subject to manipulation*
Stalingrad produced the most drastic changes in some typical
products of the Nazi regime, These were frequently young officersj,
ex-Hitler Youth members, whose world broke asunder at Stalingrad,
Some, as mentioned earlier, rather than surrender had committed suicider
The others emerged from their shock as some of the most bitter enemies
of the Nazi regime, They sought advice among their elders, and as
this was not forthcoming, the Soviets stepped in to fill the vacuuma
*This must be seen as part of an overall policy-decision,, extending beyond
the PWN population--part of the fluctuating fortune of the intellectual
in the USSR which normally seems at their lowest ebb whenever tensions
with the capitalist world outside are on the increase, Such was the
situation in 1947 which marked the beginning of the cold w ar, Fears of
unreliability of all elements lacking a working-class backgroundvould
seem to be at the root of these trends,
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2. Manipulative Devices
The Soviets fully exploited their monopolistic position as captors
to manipulate PWs and their environment in an effort toward furthering
their owm goals* The method and intensity of manipulative devices
varied from camp to camp and from purpose group to purpose group.
Not all may have been intentional which, however, is irrelevant for
the purposes of this discussion.
(a) The breaking-up of formal and informal groups)
Sometimes officers would be relieved from command of their
units immediately upon surrender; often, however, they retained command
up to the time when collection centers were reached, Their subsequent
removal broke up the internal structure of the larger unitso Unlik in
the Korean War, NCO were not segregated from the enlisted men and
frequently assumed command of labor gangs, Thus, in the labor camps,
the internal structure of the smaller units was frequently retained
and the Russians made no attempt to break down these groups as long
as cohesiveness was canalized in the direction of work performance;
but they stepped in immediately, if and when it was used for political
purposes, The informer system usually provided timely warnings against
the latter, The segregation of officers was only complete in the
cases of those who were transferred to special officers ' camps, A
large percentage of the lower ranking officers remained in the a ame
Schein, EH 0 , The Chinese Indoctrination Program for Prisoners of War,
Psychiatry, 1956, Volume 19,
ecamps with the enlisted men and were merely separately quartered,
Unlike the enlisted men and NCOs they were at least up to 1946 not
forced to work, except for the maintenance of their camps, and
received better food rations.
With minor exceptions (e.g.,, at certain periods at Krasnogorsk
or Yelabuga), PWs were also segregated by nationality, This segre-
gation was strictly enforced at the A-schools,
Spontaneous groups that formed around effective resisters to
prevent collaboration and/or planned escapes would be broken up after
ring leaders had been rounded up (after being identified through the
spy and informer system), and transferred to isolation blocks,,
disciplinary camps, or prisons,
The planting of a large-scale spy and informer network among PWs
had the secondary effect of breaking up informal group ties and
leading to social withdrawal However, the group destruction was
decidedly less complete than in Korea.,
Also in contrast to the Korean situation, army chaplains were often
permitted to hold services and to administer last riteso Among the
Whereas solitary confinement was a frequent form of punishment, there is
no evidence of Soviet use of the group techniques employed in Chinese
Communist prisons. The only comparable situations in the USSR were the
sessions of self-criticism and autobiographic reports at A-schools which,
at least in the later years, seemed to elicit responses very similar to
those described by veterans of the Chinese prisonso For a discussion
of Chinese Communist techniques see Schein, o2 cit. and Lifton, "Thought
f Western Civilians in Chinese Communios"Prisons, Psychiatry, 1956,
** Schein, o cit.
chaplains, there were those who cooperated, either because of their
anti-Nasi sentiments, or because they lacked the courage to resist,
Others, aware of the informer system, had to move with extreme caution
and delicacy, lest they be removedt Thus, they mostly restricted
their activities to improving morale among the men struggling for
biological survival, In other words, while chaplains retained some
of their positions of authority and influence, such influence could
be exerted in either direction,
(b) "Shock treatment" and physical torturer
A frequently reported, but not universally applied practice was
the simulation of planned execution, German PWs were an easy prey
to the staging of these situations, as Nazi propaganda had spread the
nWth that the Soviets took no prisoners, Thus, FW expected execution
almost any time after their capture.. In each of these instances to
face what was believed to be certain death initiated a process of
pqchological preparation for the ordeal, the degree of composure
obviously depending upon the personality structure of the individual,
It was occasionally accompanied by such symbolic acts as the tearing
up of snapshots of loved ones and letters, All those situations
occurred shortly after captivity when the will to survive was strong and
apathy had not yet set in. The realisution that life would continue
usually caused relief but also the expressed reaction on the part of
some subjects that they wou3d rather be dead than go through a similar
experience for a second tina
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Physical torture was not unknown, although rarely practiced.
PWa during their initial marches, or immediately upon capture
(notably flyers) might be manhandled, or beaten up, These were,
*however, spontaneous, unorganised and unintended events, Even known
cases of extreme violence against obstructionists must be seen as
individual trespasses and not as part of a deliberate schemer More
typical, and used as a punishment to induce collaboration were such
practices as letting W stand barefooted in the cold for hours,
placing them into standing cells, etc,
(c) Searches and strippings,
Repeated bodily searches -and the confiscation of the last
preserved letters or photos of loved ones removed the last visible
ties with the outside world. W who were uncooperative at inter.
rogations frequently would be stripped of all their clothes in the
presence of women interpreters, This again had the effect of removing
the last vestiges of privacy and smbolized the prisoner s complete
dependence upon his captor9
(d) Information control,
Cut off from the rest of the world, the prisoner's only information
about the war and world events came from whatever his captor wanted him
to know0 He could disbelieve Soviet propaganda but he had no means of
checking, except in the rare instances when a more recent prisoner would
join a group of older ones0 Until 1943, the PW newspaper Das Freie Wort
*Unintended in the terms of this essay; not unintended, of course, from
the point of view of internal hate propaganda.
Awas his major source of information to be superseded during the days
o' the NKFD by ftreies Deutschland, In the later postwar years,
vommunist-controlled East German newspapers were admitted in PW camps -
An exchange of mail did not exist during the war years because
of Nasi policy;* in the postwar years the Soviets manipulated mail to
serve their ends, They might withhold letters containing favorable
news, and distribute those containing unfavorable news They might
hand a photo attached to a letter to the recipient but withhold the
letter. Or, they might merely delay distribution for several months
to coincide with a Soviet holiday.
As in all communities in which information is meagre and rigidly
controlled, there was a fertile ground for the spreading of numore
(e) Rewards and punishment 0
Food and physical comforts were intensely used for manipulative
purposes, In the labor camps they were so completely substandard
that the offer of any extra food was a powerful motivating force, It
was used to induce PW to become informers, to engage in other a cts
of collaboration,:or to increase their work output (Pramienreis),,
During the recruiting drive for the NKFD, meat dishes, unknown to the
average prisoner at Yelabuga, would demonstratively be carried past
all other tables to the last one in the mess hall around which members
This pernmitted the Soviets to induce N. to urite messages to their
families on leaflets which were naturally infiltrated with propaganda
material,
"These techniques are strikingly parallel to those used by the Chinese
Communists in their handlings of American PWs, Schein, M cit,
of the NKFD were gathered and above which it read in big letters:
"Join the National Comittee." Food and cigarettes would regularly
be used during interrogations, and the state prisons at Moscow, the
Lubianka and the Butyraka, to which many prominent PWs were taken
for weeks and months (in some cases even years) of interrogation and
"softening-up"1 periods, maintained a system of dozens of different
diets for manipulative purposes, from the withhoding of all food and
water or the serving of obnoxious food, to boxes of chocolates,
The latter two prisons also had a great varietyv of cells, ranging
from single standing cells, or vermin-infested holed, to comfortable
rooms, both for solitary or group confinement, Solitary confineient,
or the segregation of rebellious groups in isolation blocks was
common practice in all camps as a punishment, Venin in barracks,
but also deliberately planted vermin in certain solitary confinement
cells* proved for some of the mos t courageous resisters more difficult
to endure than extreme physical violence,
There is no evidence that sex was used to induce collaborationie
The struggle for sheer survival in the labor camps precluded all talk
*I have no evidence that vermin was deliberately planted in socalled "holes"
in camps; but the fact that it existed in the Soviet state prisons men.-
tioned here, with their large variety of different accommodations, suggests
by implication that here at. least it was not accidental and that there
was methoda The German habitually complains about alleged filth in other
European countries, notably all Latin, Balkan and East European countri.esi
and obviously attaches a symbolic value to cleanliness., My personal im-
pression is that he is only slightly less vulnerable than the American to
being made dirty.
A few incidents are known of "activists" being degraded and transferred
to disciplinary camps for illicit affairs with Russian interpreters,
on sex among Pe until 1949-M50, when general conditions improved.
Instead, food was the unending subject of conversation, PWs would
discuss in detail the miserable dishes they received and engage in
day-dreaming about the most elaborate menus they would have after
their release.
The use of threats and promises was a frequently practiced
device, The threat of being sent to prison, or dieciplinary Zamp,
or to be returned to a labor camp, when one had successfully escaped
its hardships, acted as- a powerful deterrent, Likewise, the promise
of early repatriation, or, contrarywise, the threat of no or late
repatriation were very meaningful to prisoners, since no lists o'
captives had been exchanged in wartime, and since, after Germany's
collapse, there seemed to be no outside power that would look after
their interests and act as a check on the Soviets' arbitrary handling
of the PW question,
Black-listed PWe were easily pressured into informer services,
or other forms of collaboration, in the hope thereby of escaping war
crimes trials, or at least of being let off with a milder sentence,
Once a prisoner had allowed himself to become an informer, it was a
relatively simple matter to blacknail him into further collaboration,
Nor did the use of threats cease at the level of the A-school
student or activist. For example, the former would be threatened with
An exception were the generals' camps, where relatively normal conditions
prevailed, and much boasting was going on as to one Is experiences at the
Folies Bergeres, etc.
immediate transfer to a labor camp if he refused to take the anti-
fascist oath on graduation, while the latter could never be certain
of not sharing the same fate if he failed to conform to the official
line, whatever that might be at the particular moment, Members of
the executive of the NKFD, -whose unquestioned loyalty was in doubt,
would be reminded at the time when "loyalists" were being repatriated
to Germany that "trains were also going East", meaning Siberia,
Certain collaborators, repatriated to East Germany, were forced
to divorce their wives if the latter were considered unreliable-
others whose wives resided in West Germany were given the alternative
of arranging for their wives' transfer to East Germany, or of obtai-ning
a divorce, Refusal to do either resulted in the immediate transfer
of subjects to labor camps and several more years of captivity.
Toward PWs, in whose collaboration the Soviets were particular3
interested, yet who were recalcitrant, the threat of reprisals against
their families inside Germany was even used in wartime, with the
meaningful remark that the NKVD had a long arm, Threats of death
were not infrequent in such cases either.
(f) Direct and indirect attacks on belief systems,
Collaboration is used here in the sense of engaging in acts
that give aid and comfort to the enemy above and beyond what is per-
missible under the Geneva Convention, Whereas the attendance of
"Marxist-circles" in itself would at first glance not seem to fan
under that category, it does in the sense that each additional attendant
aundermined the position of the resisting PWs; rewards offered to
attendants can be construed as being possible only at the expense of
the other PW; and worst of all, it permitted the Soviets to black-
mail participants, once they had aroused the suspicions of their
fellow prisoners by this initial act,
The most intensive efforts to influence directly the beliefs,
attitudes and values of PWs occurred in the officers' camps, or the
so-called "recreation"-camps, These were the "political" camps, as
distinct from the labor camps in which indoctrination always played
a secondary role, The latter consequently contained fewer well-stocked
libraries, and fewer political meetings, lectures and discussions
would take place in the evenings, when the average prisoner was much
too tired for any serious study. The prisoner who joined a "Marxist-
circle" would soon be ostracised by the non-collaborators which, in
turn, pushed him further into the camp of the collaborators . There
are few cases who, after engaging in minor collaboration for some
time, withdrew from it completely and were fully accepted by their
fellow prisoners, Discussions in the more loosely organized "Marxist,
circles", just as in the highly structured meetings at the A-schools,
were conducted in a manner in which predetermined conclusions would
be rationalized in the course of the discussion,, It was a kind of role.
playing and the Soviets seemed to place much stock in its effect. Below
are some of the topics frequently used:
(1) Why are wars inevitable under imperialism?
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(2) Why was the German November revolution a bourgeois
revolution and not a socialist revolution?
(3) Describe the process of capitalist exploitation;
(4) Why is it in the vital interests of the German people
that the Potsdam decisions should be carried out to the
letter?
(5) 'hy is it one of the most important tasks of the German
people to pay reparations?
To induce PWs to write articles for wall papers, to produce
leaflets, to sign resolutions, etc,, were other favorite devices.
ducces3 and failure of Soviet efforts in large measure depended
upon the caliber of polit-instructors and activists in camps, or of
lecturers at A-schools An unscrupulous polit-instructor who
instigated a reign of terror in his camp might be highly succe:ssful
in enlisting the services of some of the worst elements, but at the
same time, would strengthen the camp of the resisters; on the other
hand, a seemingly upright and highly intelligent polit -instructor may
have hrd a special appeal to many well-meaning but misled individuals
ach served a definite purpose in the Soviet scheme, although there
were, of course, also a series of wholly ineffective types, In
contrast to the Chinese situation, lcnguage was much lIess of a barrier
to indoctrination efforts,, Many Russians spoke German and there was
also the fairly large number of German emigres who formed the majority
of polit-instructors,.
Vis its of prominent Communist emigres, including former members
of Parliament' who would hold speeches and conduct informal talks
with prisoners 'was another form of attacking beliefs, The same
prestige effect was later used by certain prominent collaborators,
notably some generals, popular air aces, etc.,
The holding of ceaseless interrogations and the manner in which
they were conducted constituted another kind of attack- Methods
would alternate from threats and cajoling to the most friendly and
informal conversations. The same friendly interrogator sometimes
saw a subject repeatedly for weeks and months, or practically lived
with him, Statements made in each successive interview would be
checked against those made earlier. A familiar method to break the
resistance of subjects was to ask them about matters on which the
Soviets were well informed anyway. Upon subjectus refusal to supply
the information, or upon the submission of misleading information,
punishment would follow immediately, and subject would then be shown
that the Soviets had the answers all the time, This obviously was
designed to create the impression that the Soviets had all the
answers and that it was, therefore, not worth while to continue
resistance and inflict punishment,
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V , EFFECTS OF SOVIET INDOCTRINATION EFFORTS
The non-existence of official German records relating to the
fate of members of the Whrmacht fighting on the eastern front (eoge
lists of prisoners ), and the absence of a meaningful sample o!
interviews with repatriated PWs foredooms any statistical effect
analysis, An overall assessment must, therefore, be based on a
series of cautious estimates that come from PWe themselves (some of
whom had gone through as many as 30 prisoner-of-war camps) and which
have been carefully checked against each other,
At the height of the "Free Germany" movement between 35% and
45% of the officers and approximately 75% of the enlisted men
identified themselves with either the NKFD or the BDO. (This does
not include such acts as the generals' proclamation of December 1944
in which a much higher percentage of the captured total participated,)
The greatest increase came in the year 1944 after the collapse of the
central front and the assassination attempt upon Hitler. It would
seem that among the enlisted men and officers residing in labor camps
membership figures further increased well into 1945,, whereas in the
officers' and especially the generals' camps they dropped after having
reached a peak in the second half of 1944. By the time the capitulation
generals had reached the camps, all the generals who had joined the
movement more recently, except two or three, renounced their membership.
Wehrmwcht records were not kept up to date during the chaotic last phase
of the war and existing ones were in part destroyed, Lsts of Na were
never exchanged between the USSR and Nazi Germany.,
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This, as has been pointed out earlier, however, did not necessarily
mean that all collaborb ion would cease. Within the camps they
conformed with the then overriding opinion of the "resisters"; outside
the camps at least some of them conformed with Soviet wishes from
fear of being tried as war criminals, That their fears were not un-
founded was shown by their later fate, Of a total of 480 German
generals that fell into Soviet hands., 20 were executed, while 227
were either released after trial, or died while serving their
sentences.
As the statistics of the generals, though far from complete, are
nevertheless more complete than those of any other group, it may be
worth while to examine them further, The 480 captured generals in4
clude 12 who, after prolonged captivity, obtained key positions in
East Germany, Five of them were captured in 1943 (Stalingrad), three
in 1944, and four in 1945. Ten of the twelve have been identified
with the NKD/HDO0  Two of the four taken in 1945 and not identified
with the NKFD/ED0 were kidnapped by the Soviets in their homes, ,Fear
of an unknown future would seem to have converted these two me n into
Soviet tools, Since all others of the original twelve were identified
with the NKFD/BDO, it might be suggested that the activity within the
organizations constantly reinforced collaborative habits, Before such
a conclusion may be drawn, however, it will be necessary to look at
the record of all the generals associated at ofne time or another with
*The fate of some of the 480 is unknown, hence, the total number of those




Following the collapse of the central front a total oif thirty
out of seventy captured generals were members of the BDO. The
majority of these had merely joined the organization in their
respective camps, without performing any propaganda work,, as did the
group at Iunovo All the generals who had been "inactive" BDO members
in the generals' camps renounced membership after Germany's collapse-
Nine of the "active" members at Lunovo are identical vith nineut
of the twelve who later served the Soviets in East Germany, it would
seem fair to conclude, therefore, that membership per se did noc
constitute an irrevocable act, but that it was the "active" memoer
who became hopelessly trapped (a) because the repetition and greate
intensity of his collaborative acts reinforced the habit; and (1)
because he found himself in an environment that consisted of
"collaborators" only (though of very different shades and degrees oi
intensity), The "inactive" member, in contrast, lived in an environ-
ment that was dominated by the non-collaborators,
Another even more striking variable that warranta special
attention is the time and circumstance of capture. As nmentioned abo-!ve,
five of the 12 "permanent" collaborators were captured at Stalingrad,
The total population of Stalingrad generals was 23. The number of
"permanent" collaborators among the total population of 480 was twelve,
which means that outside the Stalingrad group only 7 "permanent"
collaborators came from a population of 457r,
*Of the 20 generals captured at the central front in 19i4, all of whom
called for the removal of Hitler in a joint appeal, only one has
become a "permanent" collaborator5
In the light of some of the figures of the other officera
which, unlike the generals, have to be based on estimates, it would
seem that it was not their longer captivity but, rather, their
unique and traumatic experience which made the Stalingrad group
particularly vulnerable,
Since the initially quoted estimates of 75% NKFI adherents
among the enlis ted men and 3545% of EDO members among the officers
at the peak of the "Free Germany" movement are not very meaningful
in view of the different levels of collaboration expected (the mas
entry into the NKFD in labor camps could almost be compared to the
signing of "peace petitions" in Korean campe), the remainder of
this inquiry will be addressed to the more serious collaborators,
i eo the Executive Council of the NKFD/BDO and the A-schools.
Of the Lunovo group of some 50-55 members* nbout 4O attained
prominent positions in East Germany after their repatriation- TWo
of these did not remain "permanenth collaborators, but have flIed to
West Germany since, Another three, including two old-,time Communists
and a former member of the SS, were either tried or removed from
their positionsa Seven or eight were returned to West Germany, and
the fate of 2-7 remains uncertain, At least one died in captivity0
A veteran of 30 Soviet PW camps has estimated that only 5% of inmates
of labor camps were more serious collaborators, whereas that figure
climbed to approximately 30% in "recreation" camps v
*This examination considers the group after the removal of Dr, Wvieder
and his associates and the discovery of the Hubert affair,
6c
Approximately 50% of the Lunovo group were graduates of the
A-schools, All of these received trusted positions in East Germany,
two subsequently escaped to West Germany, two or three were later
ejected from positions of influence, They comprised two generals,
twelve or thirteen other officers, and 10 or 11 enlisted men or
NCOas, They also could be broken down into 54 professional soldiers
2 fliers, 4-5 teachers, or intellectuals (including one ex-CozM.unist),
1 or 2 ex-SS members, and 7 or 8 working class ele-iments, including
ex-Communists
The group that was returned to West Germany included the clergy-
men, one general, and about 3 other officers, including one ex-Nazi
who had held a key position in the Ministry of Education and an army
G-2 officer who was a high school teacher in private life,and tae son
of a well-known general,
The above figures demonstrate the significant role assigned to
the A-schools which, as far as the Lunovo group was concerned, pro-
duced only two non-permanent collaborators (the expulsion or demotion
of the three other cases mentioned above were the result of corruption,
or the withholding of information from their past history, rather than
disloyalty to the Communist cause)0 Outside the Lunovo group, it
has been estimated by a former teacher and assistant of Talisi and
graduate from Krasnogorsk that 90% of all A-school graduates,
The same source estimates the number of old-time Communists among the
graduates at Talisi at about 30%,
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repatriated to East Germany, are in responsible positions there now,
while about 10% have escaped to West Germany, since mere withdrawal
from politics would be interpreted as opposition, Of those A-school
graduates repatriated to West Germany, including agents, one out of
every five or six is believed to have remained an active Communist,
whereas the others either quickly withdrew from politics, or broke
with Communism after a struggle,
The striking percentage of successful indoctrination, if indeed it
reflects ideological change rather than mere behavioral compliance,
must be attributed both to the iniIal selection procedures and to the
teaching methods of the A-schoo3s., Of course, the A--school graduate
also anticipated immediate rewards for his allegiance to Comunism
and often found himself in a position of being committed to a course
of action from which he could not retreat,
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VI SOE EXPLANATORY HWPOTHESES
As one examines the sketchy record of experiences of German
Ws in the USSR between 1941-56, as outlined in the preceding pages,
it becomes apparent that changes brought about in the overt
behavior and beliefs of certain prisoners were the result of a
peculiar combination of (1) conscious Soviet efforts to manipulate
the prisonersu environment, (2) direct attacks upon the prisonersO
belief systems, and (3) the general physical and sanitary condition6
of captivity which in large part were "unintended" and the direct
result of the war, or living conditions inside the Soviet Union
The following pages will present some hypotheses concerning the conditions
under which these changes occur and on their permanence,
Under conditions of extreme physical and mental stress accepted
group norms tend to break down and the ensuing situation may best
be described as one of "everyone for himself". The Soviets fostered
and accelerated this process by breaking up formal and informal
groups, and by segregating prominent resistance leaders who otlir-
wise might have enforced compliance with previous group norms. By
introducing a system of rewards and punishment the Soviets channeled
changed behavior in the direction of collaboration.
As changes in overt behavior became more pronounced, they became
increasingly less consonant with basic beliefs and values,
In the isolation block at Yelabuga, e~g., such compliance was rigidly
enforced.
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leading to conflict or dissonance- As Leon Festinger has pointed
out, dissonance is a powerful motivating force in itself, aimed
at dissonance reduction. There were a number of ways in which
subjects under consideration here could seek reduction of dissonance.
They could attempt to check their new behavior, reverse it, and
bring it once again into line with their basic beliefs, This,
however, was no easy task. Their fellow-prisoners who had contributed
toward increasing dissonance by ostracising them would be most
skeptical of a "reformed" collaborator, which was not surprising in
an atmosphere poisoned by the activities of informers. It worked
best in those rare instances where informal groups and group norms
continued to exist so that "rehabilitation" could be effected
through an initiation proceduret,
Nor was this method capable of solving the problem in those
cases where changes in overt behavior had been induced by extreme
physical conditions, and the threat to survival, thus a powerful
motivating force to avert death, persisted.
Another way by which dissonance could be reduced was to change
one's environment, or to make the environment fit the new behaviore
L. Festinger A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance (Evanston, Ill.,, Row,
Peterson, 1957)*
*Ibid
the submission of several generals to "courts of honor" in the
generals' camps at Voikova and Susdal,
****This obviously did not apply to the cases of the generals.
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This, for some time at least, seemed to be the process that could
be detected among certain elements of the right-wing group at
Lunovo- They had engaged in various acts of collborati -out of
opposition to the Nazi regime--acts which many of their fellow-
prisoners in the officers' camps would consider treasonablee The
resulting dissonance was reduced with their transfer to Lunovo, for
in this new environment they were no longer a minority ostracized
by the resisters; on the contrary, interaction with other collaborators
confirmed and reinforced the "correctness" of the path they had
*
chosen, With the establishment of the NKFD/BDO they had created an
instrument that fitted their behavior and yet seemed consonant with
their beliefs,
As hope faded that the NKFD/EHO could act as an independent,
nationalist body (and it became clear that the Communist emigres were
the true decision-makers), dissonance inevitably reappeared, There
were those who chose alternative no, 1, adopted a firm attitude
toward further Communist encroachments and accepted the consequences
of being ousted,* thereby making certain that their overt behavior
would not hopelessly depart from their beliefs,
Others chose a third alternative of dissonance reduction which
was to change their beliefs and to bring them into line with their
In the case of Gen. v, Seydlits only the mass movement of generals into
the EO almost a year later, and particularly the eventual entry of
Field Marshall v. Paulus, the C-in-C of the Stalingrad forces, in
August 1944 relieved him (temporarily) of serious scruplesc
* Dr, Wieder and his group.
Eog ,, the generals M1ler and lenski,
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new behavior, This was successfully done by most of the A school
graduates.
The question of the permanency of such "conversions" obviously
depends in large measure upon existing controls0 The estimated 90%
of all A-school graduates who have gained key positions in East
Germany continue to live in an environment that demands overt
Communist or neo-Communist behavior, that offers major rewards for
continued allegiance to the Communist cause, and threatens severe
punishment to defectors and their families, Serious doubts in one s
new values would once again create dissonance, termed "political
bellyaches" in East Germany which, if unchecked, could only be
reduced by escape,
"Converts" who were repatriated to West Germany upon re-entry
into their new environment are assumed to undergo the same processes
of change, if in a less dramatic and intense manner, that they had
experienced in the early phase of their captivity, The need to yield
to group pressures and to comply with group behavior will gradually
cause subjects to modify their overt behaviorc The resulting
dissonance will (on the basis of the estimate that only every fifth
Eg. Count v. Einsiedel and Capt 0 Fleischer
Gen., V Seydlits, upon his return to West Germany on October 8, 1955,
attacked the policies of the Bonn Government, blamed them for the re-
armament of both Germanys and propagated a policy of greater friendship
with the Soviet Union. Two days later he repudiated the statement which,
he said, had been made as part of a shock reaction and declared that he
would not engage in politics, Di et, Hamburg October 8 and 10, 195)
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or sixth returnee remained a Communist) in the majority oJ cases be
reduced after examination and readjustment of one' s values with the
new behavior, This should not be looked upon as a chronological
process in which behavioral changes must precede changes it beliefs-
the opposite may occur in certain cases, and generally spe king, it
would appear that simultaneous attacks upon behavior and beliefs are
the most effective, especially during original indoctrinat:Dn,
This does not, of course, account for the few subject. who, upon
repatriation to a non-Communist' society, remain Communists, In the
case of "converts" returned to West Germany most of those - o had
occupied prominent positions in the Communist Pariy of West . rmany
pending its dissolution left for East Germany after the ba, The
others were mostly agents, The first of these two groups, b4 virtue
of their activities in the Communist Party, continued to eng ge in
overt behavior that was consonant with their belief systemso Voluntary
exposure to Communist news media and regular contacts with Moscow
reinforced their beliefs, despite the accessibility of other soi eces
Thus, dissonance was not createdo The agents, on the other haem, by
their very activities (and presumably by earlier activities as w.l)
had committed themselves irrevocably, i e0 , they had engaged in
behavior that could only be justified in terms of the belief systerl
and values of those to whom they owed allegiance. Courting of a
different belief system threatened self-effacement,,
The same phenomenon is believed to explain the hold over informers,
deserters, etc,
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So far changes in overt behavior and of beliefs have been dis
cussed in terms of dissonance and dissonance reduction, as induced by
external forces, such as the manipulation of the environment, direct
and indirect attacks upon belief systems, etc. Such changes also
depended, of course, upon the character traits of the individual
target and his previous environmental conditioningo
It is in the nature of totalitarian societies, such as the Nazi
state, to foster opportunism, for whereas only a fraction of the
population can be expected to accept the ideology of the regime, its
intolerance toward opposition of any kind forces the rest to render
lip-service to the ruling circles-, This ready opportunism would seem
to have been partly responsible for the willingness of many PWs to
engage in some form of collaboration"
In contrast to Anglo-Saxon pragmatism, German national character
generally has been characterized by a greater affinity with ideological
movements, Thus, Communism aroused curiosity and a certain attraction
among some PWe, especially as, like Nazism, it permitted identification
with strength, The conflicting reality of Soviet village life which
generally appalled German soldiers affected these subjects only insofar
as it made them critical of the Russian application of Communism,
but not of Communism itself..
Finally, identification with the captor would seem to have
provided relief to those PWs who had developed guilt complexes over
their previous involvement with Nazi operations
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